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ABSTRACT
The objective of this study is to analyze a reduced model of the determinants of public spending growth from 
a demand side perspective. The model is based on the Buchanan and Wagner hypothesis but incorporates 
several other variables considered as determinants of public spending growth as well. The formulation of 
two different equations confirmed the influence of deficit on public spending growth during the period 
1958-2014. This work provides two contributions to the analysis of public spending determinants in Spain. 
Firstly, the study period is considerably longer than that of others, and, secondly, unit root and cointe-
gration analysis are used with breakpoints, which, to our knowledge, have not been previously utilized.
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GASTO PÚBLICO Y DÉFICIT FISCAL EN ESPAÑA (1958-2014)
RESUMEN
El propósito de este trabajo es analizar un modelo reducido de determinantes del crecimiento del gasto 
público desde el lado de la demanda. El modelo está basado en la hipótesis de Buchanan y Wagner pero 
se han añadido diversas variables que se consideran determinantes de demanda del gasto público. La 
formulación de dos ecuaciones diferentes confirma la influencia del déficit en el crecimiento del gasto 
público en el período 1958-2014. El trabajo aporta dos novedades al análisis de los determinantes del 
gasto público en España: por una parte, se extiende considerablemente el período objeto de estudio; por 
otra, se usa el análisis de raíces unitarias y cointegración con puntos de ruptura, que no ha sido utilizado 
anteriormente en este caso.
PALABRAS CLAVE
Gasto público, producto interior bruto, raíz unitaria, cointegración, puntos de ruptura.
CLASIFICACIÓN JEL
H00, H50, H62, E62.
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Introducción, 1. Gasto público y déficit; 2. El modelo; 3. Test empírico del modelo; 4. Conclusiones; 
Referencias, Anexos.
GASTO PÚBLICO E DÉFICIT FISCAL NA ESPANHA (1958-2014)
RESUMO
O propósito deste trabalho é analisar um modelo reduzido de determinantes do crescimento do gasto 
público desde o lado da demanda. O modelo está baseado na hipótese Buchanan e Wagner mas se há 
adicionado diversas variáveis que se consideram determinantes de demanda do gasto público. A formulação 
de duas equações diferentes confirma a influência do déficit no crescimento do gasto público no período 
1958-2014. O trabalho aporta duas novidades à análise dos determinantes do gasto público na Espanha. 
Por uma parte se estende consideravelmente o período objeto de estudo. Por outra se usa a análise de 
raízes unitárias e co-integração com pontos de ruptura que não há sido utilizado anteriormente neste caso.
PALAVRAS CHAVE
Gasto público, produto interno bruto, raiz unitária, co-integração, pontos de ruptura.
CLASSIFICAÇÃO JEL
H00, H50, H62, E62.
CONTEÚDO
Introdução, 1. Gasto público e déficit; 2. O modelo; 3. Test empírico do modelo; 4. Conclusões; Refer-
ências, Anexos.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the studies of Niskanen (1978), economic literature received different tests 
of Buchanan and Wagner’s hypothesis. Said hypothesis states that public deficit 
increases expenditure as it reduces the tax price perceived by current tax-payers of 
public services, thus increasing demand for these services. 
Numerous tests of this hypothesis have been conducted for different countries: 
Niskanen (1978) studied the relationship for USA, Khan (1988) for Pakistan, Craigwell 
(1991) for small open economies of Barbados, Tridimas (1992) and Asworth (1995) 
used data from the United Kingdom, Provopoulos (1982), Hondroyiannis and Papa-
petrou (2001) and Christopoulos and Tsionas (2003) worked with data for Greece, 
Courakis, Roque-Moura, and Tridimas (1993) for Greece and Portugal, and Yay (2009) 
studied data for Turkey. As for Spain, this test has been carried out by Raymond and 
Gonzalez-Páramo (1988) and Jaén (1999). In general terms, the results of the above 
studies favour the Buchanan- Wagner hypothesis.
In the case of the present study, we analyze a reduced model of the determi-
nants of public spending growth from a demand side perspective. The model is 
based on the B-W hypothesis but incorporates several other variables considered, 
both theoretically and empirically, as determinants of public spending growth. This 
extension of the work allowed us to analyze the possible of validation of Wagner’s 
Law and the Baumol disparity hypothesis, which are normally formulated in bivari-
ant models. The formulation of two different equations confirmed the influence of 
deficit on public spending growth but produced different conclusions in the cases 
of income, relative prices and population.
In this essay we apply the methodology of unit root and co-integration in time 
series to make this contrast. On the one hand, this approach allows the elimination 
of possible problems of spurious regressions that can appear when variables are 
expressed in levels. On the other hand, it also makes it possible to formulate an er-
ror correction mechanism associated with co-integration vector, which provides the 
dynamic of a short run model. The study period considered in Spanish economics1 
was 1958-2014 -a period which saw many economic and social changes in the country. 
To take said changes into consideration, we allow multiple structural breaks in the 
unit-root and cointegration testing procedures of the series considered.
We obtain two conclusions:
a) In the first equation, we obtain that deficit increases government spending. The 
coefficient estimated for the income elasticity is positive with a value very close 
1 We don t´ have data for a longer period 
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to the unit, which indicates, in line with Wagner’s Law, that a rise in income in-
creases government spending. In the case of relative prices, the value obtained 
is positive, contradicting the Baumol production disparity hypothesis. Finally, 
the fact that the population coefficient value is less than 1 suggests economies 
of scale in public spending as population increases.
b) As regards the second equation, the results obtained are slightly different. 
The elasticity of public spending is approximately equal to 1, which confirms 
the B-W hypothesis. Moreover, the income has an elasticity less than 1, which 
means Wagner’s Law is not accepted. Finally, the Baumol disparity hypothesis 
is validated as it predicts that the relative prices coefficient is negative.
The remainder of this study is divided into five sections. The first section details 
the information available on expenditure and public deficit evolution during the 1958-
2014 period. In the second, we formulate the model, and in the third, we conduct 
the empirical test using data from the Spanish economy. Finally, in the fourth, a 
summary is provided which is then followed by corresponding conclusions.
1. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND DEFICIT
Recently, Spanish public expenditure has experienced sharp growth in both current 
prices as well as real prices, and GDP percentages and absolute values.
During the 1958-2014 period, which is being studied in this work, three distinct 
phases can be identified according to their nature with respect to public expenditure 
in Spain. The first phase spans from 1958 to 1975, a time in which public expenditure, 
in real prices, was less than 25% of GDP2. Public spending in the Spanish economy 
in the first part of this period was very low.
State intervention in the economy was carried out through regulation, which 
came in the form of laws and statutes. In the 1960’s, industrialisation helped increase 
public expenditure. In true Wagner fashion, economic development went hand in 
hand with an increase in population, urbanisation, housing, education, health and 
redistribution of revenue.
During the second period, between 1976 and 1985, a rapid expansion of public 
spending took place in Spain3. These expenditures increased from 23,19% of GDP 
to 42,5%, in line with countries in the OECD, whose average spending represented 
2 Gross Domestic Product.
3 Following the constitution passed in 1978, a decentralization of the political structure in Spain takes place 
accompanied by the gradual transition of powers to its various regions (called Autonomous Communities, 
A.C.) At present, the A.C. possess the most important powers, which relate to aspects that generate the larg-
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47% of GDP. Scholars concur that the fundamental driving forces behind this growth 
in public spending during that time were: 1) the transition to the democracy that 
produced a boom in demand for social rights, which had previously been withheld 
by the Franco regime, 2) economic crisis forced enterprises to acquire state grants 
or capital transfer, 3) the persistence of the budget deficit and its new financing ac-
cording to market conditions, 4) the decentralization of certain spending auspices 
without yielding any corresponding fiscal responsibility to the Spanish Autonomous 
Regions. Also during this time, a tremendous increase in unemployment occurred as 
a result of the economic recession. In order to mitigate the threat of mass layoffs, 
an initiative was established that offered the possibility of early retirement. 
In the third period, between 1986 and 1993, spending grew as a consequence 
of the socialist government policy for the Welfare State4. National health cover in-
creased, as did the number of pensioners under the non-tax paying regime and the 
quantity of their benefits. The rise in pupils in compulsory and vocational education 
programmes caused education expenditure to increase as well. Similarly, the agree-
ment with private education institutions, which entitled them to receive state subsi-
dies, also caused this spending to jump. In this period of consolidation of Spanish 
Autonomous Communities, a notable increase in expenditure was implemented by 
the State but this caused a significant deterioration of the budget balance. Towards 
the end of this period, the absolute necessity to meet the requirements established 
by the Maastricht Agreement produced a reduction in the deficit when this had just 
reached its highest value, 5,9% in relation to GDP in 1993.
Between 1994 and 1998 a drastic change took place in the public sector in Spain. 
The basic reasons for this switch can be found in the need to meet the conditions 
of both the Maastrich Agreement and the Stability and Growth Pact, in conjunc-
tion with the fact that this period coincided with the beginnings of the ascending 
phase of the economic cycle in 1996. Elevated budget deficits (7,3% of GDP in 1994) 
dropped to 2,6% in 1998, strictly complying with the condition of the Stability Pact 
(3% of GDP).
The period between 1999 and 2007 represented a period of consolidation of 
public finances in Spain, which was primarily based on the real estate bubble that 
made possible the unprecedented growth of the Spanish economy. Given this new 
economic setting, a balanced budget was achieved in 2001 with public spending 
est part of public expenditure, such as healthcare and education. However, the collection and redistribution 
of tax income still remains in the hands of the central government.
4 Welfare State uses public expenditure to make income redistribution. It is guaranteed minimum incomes to 
the citizen as well as an improvement of education and health.
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at 40% of GDP while a 4% rise in GDP also took place with respect to the previous 
period (1997-2001). 
From 2007 to 2014 an implosion of the Spanish economy occurred; this was 
sparked by the bursting of the real estate bubble. At first, expansion continued 
and the Spanish GDP reached the EU 27 average. As of that moment the Spanish 
economy, caught in the wake of American and European economies and its own 
internal problems, entered a severe recession from which it began to emerge in 2014 
with some positive GDP growth, albeit modest, (0,08%)5 and with elevated budget 
deficits (3,5% of GDP in 2013 and 2,5% of GDP in 2014). 
Even though contemporary Spanish public expenditure is vastly increasing there 
is a difference with respect to the rest of the OECD European countries. In 1960, the 
ratio with regards to GDP was 19,8% in Spain whilst in other European Countries it 
was 19,5%. Out of the total OECD, the average was 26,6%. In less than thirty years 
the respective ratios were EU (27) 46,1%, EU (15) 50,9%, and OCDE 41,1. Now, 2014, 
the ratios are E.U. (27) 48,1%, E.U. (15) 49,2%, OCDE 41,2% and Spain 43,6%.
In Graph 1, we observe the evolution of expenditure in percentages of GDP for 
both current and real prices. Three stages can be quantified. In current prices, in 
1958 the expenditure was 12,54% of GDP while in 1974 that percentage was 21,45%.
Graph 16. Public expenditure/Gross domestic product current and real prices
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5 The data are taken from the General State Comptroller of the Treasury Department (IGAE, in Spanish).
6 PEDGP: Public expenditure/gross domestic product. PEDGPCTE: PEcte/DGPcte
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Over a period of sixteen years, total expenditure increased by 8,89%, thus 
indicating an annual average increase of 0,56 points.
In 1975, public expenditure was 22,95% of GDP against the 36,9% in 1982, thus 
revealing a 14% rise, an average annual increase of 1,75 points.
In 1995, it increased to 46,92% of GDP, or 0,72 points on average. The highest 
value registered, in percentage terms, is seen in 1992 when it reaches 48% of GDP. 
Due to the need to meet the conditions of the Maastrich Pact, it was not until 1997 
when a strong decrease in public spending took place, and in 1998 it had dropped 
to 42% of GDP. In the years that followed, the need to comply with the Stability and 
Growth Pact drove the Spanish public sector to its lowest levels since 1980 with 
public spending in 2006 reaching 38,3% of GDP. The recession in the years to come 
caused public spending to rise (among other expenditures, there was a conversion 
of private banking debt into a public sector expenditure), recently placing it at 47,13% 
of GDP in 2013 and 43,6% of GDP in 2014. 
If we consider expenditure as well as GDP in real prices, we can verify that a part 
of that increase is due to price effect. As many authors, between others Beck (1976, 
1981), state government expenditure has a tendency to be overestimated when it is 
measured at current prices, provided that output growth rate is lower in the public 
sector due to inherent qualities of public output.
We obtain a better view of that increase if government expenditure is deflated 
by its own implicit deflator.
At real prices public expenditure in 1958 represented 18,08% of GPD as opposed 
to 22,31% in 1974, revealing an increase of 5,17% rather than the 8,89% found previ-
ously. We can attribute 3,72 points of increase, that is to say a 41,8%, to the price 
effect. In 1975, in real terms, expenditure represented 23,75% of GDP while in 1982 
the percentage was 35,52%. Consequently, the increase would be 11,74%, therefore, 
we can attribute 2,26 points to price effect. In 1995, in real prices, expenditure 
represented 45,1% of GDP, with an increase of 9,32% in the 82-95 period. Given that 
in current prices the increase was 10,02%, we can attribute 0,7 points to the price 
effect. In 1996, in real prices, expenditure represented 43% of GDP, and 43,6% in 2014.
Even though the most significant increase in public deficit occurred after 1975, 
Fuentes and Barea (1996) believe that in Spanish finance there is a historical trend 
of public deficit which lies in the strict nature of the fiscal system and the impos-
sibility of financing vast public expenditures when citizen requirements increase 
with only a minimum level of tax revenue. Graph 2 shows evolution of public deficit 
in the period 1958-2014
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Graph 2. Public deficit in Spain 1958-2014
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In line with Serrano (1999), there have been three distinct phases in the evolution 
of deficit in recent years. Increase in deficit had been continuous until 1985. This 
was caused by a weak government and measures by the opposition of the PSOE 
who fostered a substantial growth in expenditure and deficit in order to alleviate 
the economic crisis.
This situation continued in the early years of the socialist government. In the 
fourth year, the situation improved after Spain’s admission into the European Com-
munity and economic recovery thanks to a favourable period of time in Europe, 
although the deficit was not completely eliminated.
Between 1990 and 1993 an increase in social expenditure, which was funda-
mentally brought about by the general strike and the investments in infrastructures 
for the Olympic Games and Expo’92, in conjunction with its own accrued debt and 
economic change. In recent years the signing of the Maastricht Agreement meant 
having to reduce the deficit in order to comply with the entry requirements of the 
EMU (European Monetary Union). This forced the government to reduce the deficit, 
which reached a value of 2,9% of GDP in 1998. From 1999 to 2014 there was a period 
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of decline with fiscal surplus from 2005 to 2008. Later, the economic crisis consti-
tuted a new period of deficit, reaching the maximum in 2012 with 10,32% of GDP. 
From a financial point of view, Serrano (1999) and Hernández (1996) identifies 
two main phases.
Firstly, in matters of finance, the Spanish Central Bank was highly exploited as 
a resource, and the resources of the financial system were not accessible because 
of investment ratio. This constituted an inexpensive system, but it interfered with 
monetary control and also the fight against inflation. This had a negative impact 
on the efficient distribution of bank credit, mainly due to the goal of maintaining 
privileged channels of financing for the public sector, thus altering all other prices.
Secondly, since mid-1984, deficit is financed by capital market sources thanks 
to public debts policy. Essentially, debt is managed by a treasurer with tools to 
ensure suitable finance of public deficit to permit lower costs. This system has the 
advantage of not directly affecting monetary policy, however, it produces a lack of 
finance in the economy as a whole.
2. THE MODEL
Among the various explanations for the increase in public expenditure, the most 
renown is Buchanan and Wagner’s (1977)7 hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, budget deficits allow for a higher level of expen-
diture. Its proposition lies on the premise that public deficits reduce the perceived 
prices of goods and services provided to the current generation of voters, which, in 
turn, increases the demand for such social services8.
Niskanen (1978) considers that budget deficit will reduce the perceived prices 
of federal services by current generations of voters as long as one or a combination 
of the three conditions is met:
1)  Voters are unaware of the future tax liabilities due to current deficits.
2)  Voters discount this future tax liability at a higher rate than the interest rate on 
public debt.
7 Borcherding (1985) says Buchanan and Wagner published a provocative book titled “Democracy in Deficit: Politi-
cal Legacy of Keynes” in which it was said that the public acceptance of Keynes’s paradigm helped to finance 
deficit and increase public expenditure”.
8 They consider that Keynes’s macroeconomic theory provides a legitimate justification for the State incurring 
annual deficits that reduce apparent price of public services in relation to a private service provision for the 
current generation of taxpayers. Consequently, public service supply (and government expenditure) increases 
as debt affects future generations of taxpayers.
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3)  Voters have finite lives, and they value the future tax liability during their life 
more than the liability of subsequent generations.
Once these three conditions are satisfied and there is a negative elasticity of 
demand of governmental services regarding the perceived tax price, government 
expenditure will increase. 
The model considered in the present study is based on Niskanen (1978), Raymond 
and Gonzalez-Páramo (1988), Asworth (1995) and Jaén (1999).
Initially, we take the function of the average taxpayer-voter’s demand for govern-
ment services based on the approximation developed by Borcherding and Deacon 
(1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973)
  LnQ LnT LnVα β γ= + + 9 [1]
Q is the amount of government services consumed by the average voter, T is 
the tax price perceived by the aforementioned average taxpayer-voter and V is the 
latter’s income. 
Q is not directly observable, however, the QC product would give us public 
expenditure per taxpayer with C being unit cost of government services.10
Meanwhile, QCN product gives us total public expenditure with N, the total 
population. If G = QCN, the result is:
  LnG LnT LnV LnC LnNα β γ= + + + + [2]
T is equal to CF product; C is unit cost of government services and F represents 
the tax participation in government services paid by the average taxpayer-voter. 
Likewise, the unit tax participation F is the total fraction of public expenditure and 
G = QCN paid by taxpayer I. That means F = (I/G)(1/N)11. If total income is considered 
rather than per capita income Y = VN, the result is
9 Niskanen (1978) and Raymond and González-Páramo (1988) consider a variable representing autonomous 
influences, which affects the demand of government services. In our case we have preferred to concentrate 
only on the elements of demand theory of the model.
10 After studying Niskanen’s model (1978), it is supposed that θ = 1 in Q = G/C.1/Nθ. θ means degree of privacy 
(or publicity) of public services, θ = 0 means that goods are totally public; if cost is proportional to the 
population, it will be the unit and if there is an exclusion effect in the unit cost of the services performed 
by public sector, it will be 1. When θ = 0, unit cost is invariant to the number of taxpayers to whom these 
services are supplied. Economies of scale emerge in the provision of government services when the coef-
ficient is less than zero. The general consensus is that the degree of publicity coefficient is approximately 
unit, thus indicating that the goods and services provided by government are private in nature.
11 We follow to Niskanen (1978) to suppose that the tax participation is the same for everybody.
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 ( ) ( )1 1  ILnG Ln LnC LnY Ln
G
α β β γ β γ
 = + + + + + − −  
 [3]
Following to Tridimas (1992) and Courakis, Roque-Moura, and Tridimas (1993) 
we use adequate deflators for the different variables, that is to say, we deflate total 
government expenditure by its unit cost C; total income (GDP) by its deflator P and 
we use C/P ratio as the appropriate price variable in the regression equation. The 
result is 
 ( )1  G I CLn Ln Ln LnY LnN
C G P
α β β γ β γ
         = + + + + − −               
[4]
Or, if restrictions set within parameters12 are left aside and time consideration 
is introduced in the model
 0 1 2 3 4   t t
t t t
G I C
Ln Ln Ln LnY LnN
C G P
τ τ τ τ τ
         = + + + +               
[5]
In this equation τ1 measures the impact of the finance deficit; τ2 and τ3 measure 
the respective price and income elasticity13 and τ4 is a mixture between the degree 
of publicity about government spending, the price elasticity and income elasticity 
and reflects personal preferences.
It is expected that coefficients τ1 and τ2 are negative as opposed to τ3 and τ4, 
which must be positive.
Similar to the previous model, some authors such as Niskanen (1978), Provo-
poulos (1982), Craigwell (1991), Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (2001) Christopoulos 
and Tsionas (2003), among others14, consider that the unit cost of the bundle of cost 
services, C, is not measurable but can be a function of the average salary rate in the 
private sector (Wages) and the number of voters. That is: 
    LnC LnW LnNδ λ µ= + + [6]
If the coefficient λ is positive, the productivity growth rate in the public sector 
is lower than in the private sector. If λ is zero, there is no productivity growth, and 
if it is negative, productivity in the public sector is greater than in the private sector. 
The µ coefficient estimates to what extent the government services are “public”. If it 
is equal to zero, the government services are considered to be pure public goods, 
12 Validity of these restrictions is contrasted on 4th item
13 If τ3>1 we will have an indirect check of Wagner s´ Law. View Jaén (2011)
14 Yay and Tastan (2009) use a more simple equation.
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and if it is equal to one, their cost is proportional to the number of tax-payers/vot-
ers. And, if it is greater than the unit, there is a crowding-out effect of government 
services, while if it is negative, there will be economies of scale in the provision of 
government services.
Starting with Equation (3), and making substitutions with Equation (6) we obtain 
 0 1 2 3 4   
G I W
Ln Ln LnY Ln LnN
C G P
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
         = + + + +               
 [7]
where φ0 = α+(1+β)δ φ1 = β φ2 = γ φ3 = (1+β)λ φ4 = (1+β)µ+1-β-γ
3. EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE MODEL
If Models (5 and 7) are expressed in levels, there is a risk of producing a spurious 
regression. In contrast, the model in first differences, despite all likelihood that it 
obtains stationarity, omits all information in the long-term15. The empirical analysis 
has to be carried out carefully to verify the nature of the series because if they are 
not stationary, problems could arise in the estimation of the regression equation 
coefficients. Valid estimations for the two models require that data be stationary 
(integrated zero-order) or, if they are not stationary (integrated first-order), they 
must be cointegrated. More specifically, the first step will be to verify whether the 
variables are stationary or whether they have one or more unit roots. If they are 
integrated, an analysis will be made to verify the possible existence of cointegration 
between them. If they are cointegrated, the relationships or cointegration equations 
will be estimated. These cointegration equations specify the long-run relationships 
between the variables. Given the long period of time studied, it is possible to find 
instances of structural change in the series. For this reason, we allow structural 
breaks in the series in both the unit root and cointegrating tests. In this view Jaén 
and Molina (1997, 1999); Asworth (1995); Priesmeier and Koester (2012); Kuckuck, 
(2014). These structural breaks may be the result of changes in the economy or in 
the different factors that affect or determine the series utilized. In this situation, 
if the structural changes are not taken into consideration when the existence of a 
long-term relationship is investigated, said relationship might not be detected when 
it does indeed exist.
15 Many macroeconomic time series are not stationary and they stimulate a stochastic process rather than a 
determinist one. Non-stationarity produces many econometric problems: relations of spurious regression 
are very likely in the levels of macroeconomic variables as well as the possibility of generating inconsistent 
parameters of OLS regressions, unless the variables considered are cointegrated.
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Following Tridimas (1992); Craigwell (1991); Asworth (1995) and in order to consider 
the differences between the short and long-term responses to demand the most 
suitable option is to adopt a vector error correction model for Equation 5.
 ( ) ( ) ( )( / ) _ _ 0 _1 ( / ) _ _2 ( / ) _ _3 _
_ 4 _  
Ln G C t Ln I G t Ln C P t LnY t
LnN t
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ µ
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
+
 [8]
It avoids the problem of spurious regression because the term
  5 6 7 1 8 1 9
1 1 1
t t
t t t
G I C
Ln Ln Ln LnY LnN
C G P
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ− −
− − −
         − − − − −               
 [9]16 
Is the error correction measurement, that is to say, the long term. That would 
make the terms in first differences the drifts in the short-term of this long term.
If it is shown that (9) is a cointegration vector, the error correction mechanism 
gives us the short-term dynamic. In this way, the problems of spurious regression 
can be avoided and a long-term relationship can be established between expenditure 
increase and budget deficit. In the same manner, an appropriate methodology can 
be utilized to carry out the tests in both the short-term and long-term.
Logically, the first step is to establish the integration order of the different time 
series that specify model variables. This is done through different unit-root tests: 
Dickey-Fuller (DF or ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) among others.
Once the integration order of variables is established, a test can be conducted to 
determine whether there is a long-term relationship among some or all the variables 
using the method suggested by Johansen (1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990, 
1992) to test the existence of a cointegration vector. Finally, an additional goal is to 
find the error correction model corresponding to the cointegration vector mentioned 
in the previous point.
The variables used in the estimation are the following: price index of govern-
ment expenditures, C is defined as a weighted average of deflators of components 
of total government expenditure, G is total government expenditure; G/C is total 
government expenditure deflated by the previous price index; relative price, C/P is 
ratio of price index of government expenditure divided by implicit GDP deflator; real 
income Y is measured as GDP to constant price; I is government tax revenue and N 
16 We can use the same approach for the second equation
( ) ( )
( )
[ ( / )_( 1) _5 ( / )_ 1 _ 6 / _( 1)
_7 _ 1 _8 _( 1) _ 9] 
Ln G C t Ln I G t Ln C P t
LnY t LnN t
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
− − − − −
− − − − −
( ) )
( )
[ ( / ) ( 1) _5 ( / )_ 1 _ 6 / _( 1)
_7 _ 1 _8 _( 1) _ 9] 
Ln G C t Ln I G t Ln C P t
LnY t LnN t
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
− − − − −
− − − − −
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is total population17. In the second equation, Ln C/P is replaced by Ln W/P, where W 
is annual average wage to constant prices.
In Table 1, the data are the results of applying different unit root tests to repre-
sentative series of variables of the model. It is observed that all the series are order 
one integrated I(1).
Table 1. Unit root test18
Serie ADF test
ADFGLS 
test
PP test
KKPSS 
test
ERS test
NP test 
MZa
NP test 
MZ1
NP test 
MSB
NP test 
MPT
SP test
LnG/C –0,54* –0,73* –0,22* 0,23* 64,40* –2,35* –0,81* 0,34* 28,07* –0,78*
Ln I/G –2,92* –2,89* –2,47* 0,13* 5,51* –16,81* –2,89* 0,17* 5,47* –2,16*
Ln Y –2,26* –1,90* –0,43* 0,18* 36,65* –9,49 –1,94 0,20* 10,54* –0,98*
Ln C/P –0,42* –0,41* 1,15* 0,23* 136,98* –1,23* –0,49* 0,39* 37,55* –0,89*
Ln N –3,33* –2,88* –1,84* 0,11* 2,08* –55,58 –5,26 0,09* 1,65 –0,86*
Ln W/P –1,09* –1,58* –1,56* 0,23* 246,93 –1,53 –0,67 0,44 41,08 –0,68*
Source: Author’s elaboration
None of the tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in time series19. Utiliz-
ing the graphs20, all the tests are calculated including a constant and a trend in the 
test equation21: The lags number for ADF was calculated using SIC. The bandwidth 
for the PP and KPSS test is selected based on Newey-West using Bartlett Kernell. 
17 The data have been collected from the General State Comptroller (IGAE in Spanish), the National Statistics 
Institute (INE) and the Valencian Economic Research Institute (IVIE). The database used in the research is 
available for any researcher who requests through the e-mail: mjaen@ual.es.
18 The tests used were: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillip-Perron (PP), Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt 
and Shin (KPSS), Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) point optimal (ERS), Ng-Perron (NP) and Schmidt 
and Phillips (1992). 
19 Null hypothesis in the KKPS test is that the series is stationary
20 View appendix graphs
21 5% VC ADF -3,49; DFGLS -3,17; PP = -3,49; KPSS = 0,146; ERS = 5,71; NP = -17,9, -2,91, 0,168, 5,48; 
SP = -3,06
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For ERS and NgP we used Spectral OLS based on SIC. The symbols *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% using critical values from MacKinnon (1991), 
KPSS (1992), ERS (1996), NgP (2001) and Schmidt and Phillips (1992). 
Table 2. Unit root test for the first differences of the time series
Serie ADF test
ADFGLS 
test
PP test
KKPSS 
test
ERS test
NP test 
MZa
NP test 
MZ1
NP test 
MSB
NP test 
MPT
SP test
LnG/C –4,13* –4,04* –4,18* 0,54* 1,31* –19,73* –3,12* 0,16* 1,31 –4,66*
Ln I/G –5,66* –5,66* –5,66* 0,06 0,98* –25,83* –3,58* 0,13* 0,99 –5,46*
Ln Y –3,03* –1,88** –4,14* 0,45** 4,93* –6,72* –1,82* 0,27 3,66 –3,9**
Ln C/P –6,09* –5,99* –6,13* 1,07* 0,97* –26,4* –3,62* 0,13 0,97 –7,02*
Ln N –1,49 –1,57 –2,73** 0,13 4,81* –6,12* –1,49* 0,24* 4,78 –3,76**
Ln W/P –4,18 –3,16 –4,38 0,74 2,50 –14,20 –2,66 0,18 1,72 –3,40**
Source: Author s´ elaboration
There are strong discrepancies among the tests for the first differences in the 
series. While the first three tests confirm the stationarity of the series in the first 
four cases, for the Ln N series it is observed that the first difference has a unit root 
according to the first two tests yet it is stationary according to the rest of the tests.
However, in line with Perron (1989), the standard unit root tests tend to errone-
ously identify trending stationary processes as stationary in differences and may 
have very low power, even asymptotically, if changes in regime are ignored. Moreover, 
during the period studied, there was a great deal of social and political upheaval in 
Spain, which may have altered the course of public spending and the GDP. Therefore, 
supposing that the series might have breakpoints, different tests were conducted in 
order to detect them. Firstly, utilizing the sequential test of Bai-Perron, we obtained 
up to 3 structural breaks corresponding to the years 1978 (first democratic elections), 
1990 (boom and crisis in building sector), and 2005 (beginning of financial and eco-
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nomic crisis). As for the Chow breakpoint test, and using the same breakpoints, it 
rejects the null hypothesis of non-existence of breakpoints at the points specified. 
Given the existence of these breakpoints we conduct unit root tests allowing 
one or several structural breakpoints at unknown moments in time. The following 
chart displays the results obtained.
Table 3. Unit root tests considering structural breaks in the data22
Variable ZA test P test LP test
LnG/C –3,03 –3,11 –3,84
Ln I/G –4,60 –4,59 –4,85
Ln Y –2,84* –3,03 –3,66
Ln C/P –3,72 –3,55* –5,29
Ln N –4,00 –3,96 –4,73
Ln W/P –3,98* –4,12* –4,64
Source: Author’s elaboration
The tests conducted are Zivot Andrews (1992) unit root test (ZV), Perron (1989) 
unit root test (P) and Lumsdaine-Papell (1997) Unit root test (LP). All the cases 
of breakpoints are detected endogeneously by the tests. In the first two cases 
a maximum of one breakpoint is admitted, while the LP test can detect two or 
more breakpoints. The ZV test detects breakpoints endogeneously in 1977, 1977, 
2005, 2005, 1975 and 1972 for the different variables. In none of the cases does it 
reject the unit root hypothesis in the variables against the stationary alternative 
with structural change in both intercept and trend at an unknown date. The P test 
observes breakpoints in 1976, 1985, 1976, 1996, 1983 for the different variables. The 
lag selection method belongs to the criteria of Schwartz. It is assumed there is a 
constant and trend in the data generation process, and that there are breaks in the 
constant and trend. The critical values are taken from Perron and Vogelsang (1993). 
The values obtained with alternative specifications confirm the existence of unit 
roots in all of the variables in every case. The LP test detects breakpoints in 1980 
and 1991, 1986 and 1999, 1981 and 2007, 1985 and 2002, 1988 and 1997, and 1971 
and 1994 for the different series. In all the cases the statistical test values reveal, 
in relation to the critical values, that the series have a unit root against the most 
general alternative hypothesis. 
22 5% VC ZA = -5,08; P = -5,59; LLS = -3,06; LP = -6,75
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Table 4. Unit root tests for the first differences considering structural breaks in the data
Variable ZA test P test LP test
LnG/C –5,39 –5,40 –7,57
Ln I/G –6,64 –6,63 –6,81
Ln Y –5,20 –7,91 –7,33
Ln C/P –5,20 –7,91 –7,33
Ln N –7,91 –5,20 –9,20
Ln W/P –7,18 –7,92 –6,88
Source: Author’s elaboration
We can observe in all the tests that the variables are stationary in first differences.
Both of these preliminary steps are important for ensuring that we employ the 
correct econometric procedure. The estimation of a cointegrating relationship using 
Ordinary Least Squares, in general, is biased due to problems of endogeneity with 
the variables. Consequently, the corresponding t statistics do not follow a normal 
Student-t distribution, which is why it is not possible to make any kind of inference 
about its significance. On the other hand, performing a regression on the first dif-
ference of the variables when there actually exists a long-term relation of balance 
between them leads to the well-known problem of identifying omitted variables. In 
fact, what disappears in this type of regression is the error correction term. 
Taking into consideration the existence of unit roots in all the model variables, 
it can be considered that cointegrating relationships do exist among them. 
This analysis begins without taking into account the possible structural breaks 
that may be present among the different variables. In the first model the variables 
considered were LnG/C, LnI/G, LnY, LnC/P and LnN.
In order to consider the range of cointegration we based our work on the trace 
statistic and the asymptotic distribution of statistics, and the graph representa-
tions in cases where we encountered borderline situations. In these cases, we had 
to consider the behavior of the estimated cointegrating relationships presented 
in graphic format prior to selecting r. Another diagnostic tool is the use of graphs 
combined with the number of unit roots of the “matrix companion”, which provides 
information on the pk roots that describe the dynamic properties of the process. 
This allowed us to see how close the largest unrestricted roots were to the unit circle. 
The Johansen-Juselius cointegration test provides us with the following results.
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Table 5. Cointegration test without considering breakpoints
Eigenvalues Trace Statistic Critical Value p-value
r = 0 0,55 80,13 69,61 0,000
r = 1 0,43 43,36 47,71 0,124
r = 2 0,32 14,24 29,80 0.827
Source: Author s´ elaboration
The r = 0 hypothesis is rejected, which means it has a cointegration vector 
considering an unrestricted constant in the data. 
In order to analyze said cointegrating relationship in depth, we conduct various 
tests. Firstly, we consider the residuals graph. 
Graph 3. Residuals graph
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Source: Author’s elaboration
The graphic has four parts: real and adjusted residuals of DLNGC, standardized 
residuals and histogram of the residuals, the histogram of the density function of 
the standardized residuals and the density of the normal distribution, as well as the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality tests23 and the Jarque-Bera test. In the graph, large 
positive residuals can be observed in 1978, 1990 and 2005, precisely as predicted 
earlier with the Breush-Pagan test. The analysis of the residuals reveals problems 
with the normality, likely caused by the structural breaks, while the multivariant LM 
tests for conditional heterocedasticity are rejected. Finally, the normality test clearly 
rejects the null hypothesis (existence of normality24).
23  View Lilliefors (1967)
24 LJung-Box Statistic χ2(275) = 477,16 (0.00) Multivariant test for autocorrelation χ2 (25) = 29,12 (0.259) 
χ2 (25) = 22.95 (0.580). Doornik-Hansen normality test χ2 (10) = 43,16 (0.00) LM tests for ARCH 
χ2 (225) = 241,09 (0.22) χ2 (450) = 491,33 (0.087). 
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Secondly, we used the companion matrix where the estimated eigenvalues are 
the reciprocal values of the roots of the characteristic polynomial A(z); hence, the 
eigenvalues should be inside the unit disc or equal to 1 under the assumptions of 
the cointegrated VAR model.
If the process is I(1), the number of roots in the companion matrix is equal 
to p-r, which is also the number of stochastic tendencies common to the model, 
which means the roots of A constitute a diagnostic tool to determine the range of 
∏ (cointegration matrix). In this case we consider two possibilities: H1 (5) and H1 
(2). The former, by construction, possesses all the roots inside the unit circle but, 
in this case, four of them are very close to 1. As for the latter, three unit roots are 
significant but it can be observed that the fourth is very close to 1 as well. 
Graph 4. Roots of the companion matrix
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Source: Author’s elaboration
More specifically, in the H1 (2) case the following roots are obtained: 1, 1, 1, 0,956, 
0,696; and in the H1 (5): 0,986, 0,986, 0,986, 0,912, 0,632. In the first model (we assume 
r = 2) we discover three roots equal to 1 but there is a fourth that is very close to 1. 
In the non-restricted second (r = 5), all the roots are inside the unit circle with four 
roots very close to 1. In both cases there are four common tendencies, a fact that 
allows us to state that there is only one cointegrating relationship. 
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Once the coefficient of the dependent variable is normalized to 1, the cointegra-
tion vector is [1, -6,87 (-6,40), 2,7 (4,40), -5,30 (-6,45), -2,12 (-6,77)]. We obtained very 
different values from those that we had expected. If we represent the cointegrating 
relationship in graph form, we observe that around 1978, 1990 and 2005 there are 
outliers or breakpoints in the model, precisely as predicted by the Bai-Perron test. 
These structural breaks must be included in the cointegrating relationship in order 
to ensure results that agree with the economic reality.
Graph 5. Cointegrating relationship
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Consequently, we conducted new cointegration tests which included these break-
points. Given the methodological restrictions of Johansen et al. (2000), we included 
one or two breakpoints in order to later be able to test whether these breakpoints 
were the appropriate ones or not. 
The following table displays the results obtained when considering the break-
points of 1978, 1999 and 2005, both separately and together.
Table 6. Cointegration test considering breakpoints
Eigenvalues Trace Statistic Critical Value p-value
1978
r = 0 0,66 114,60 113,12 0,040
r = 1 0,43 64,75 83,90 0,541
r = 2 0,40 40,88 58,60 0,621
1990
r = 0 0,57 122,48 68,19 0,000
r = 1 0,47 76,34 64,84 0,004
r = 2 0,33 41,19 43,84 0,089
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Eigenvalues Trace Statistic Critical Value p-value
2005
r = 0 0,60 123,31 106,05 0,001
r = 1 0,46 73,09 73,32 0,076
r = 2 0,33 38,74 49,84 0,354
1978 and 1990
r = 0 0,63 133,98 102,51 0,000
r = 1 0,46 78,78 75,14 0,026
r = 2 0,35 45,12 51,77 0,170
1978 and 2005
r = 0 0,64 134,62 102,80 0,000
r = 1 0,46 79,01 75,41 0,026
r = 2 0,37 46,16 52,03 0,177
1990 and 2005
r = 0 0,62 134,80 119,52 0,004
r = 1 0,51 81,81 85,39 0,087
r = 2 0,33 43,07 57,01 0,415
Source: Author’s elaboration
The results in the previous table reveal a cointegrating relationship when con-
sidering the breakpoint in 1978 and 2005. It also indicates the existence of two 
cointegration vectors considering the breakpoint in 1990, two cointegration vectors 
considering 1978 and 1990 and also 1978 and 2005, and one lone cointegration 
vector considering breakpoints in 1990 and 2005. 
Along with the cointegration tests we consider the roots of the companion matrix 
in each case, as well as the graphs of the cointegrating relationships. The following 
is a summarized version of the root values of said matrices. 
Table 7. Root of the companion matrix for H(2)25
1978 1990 2005
1978 and 
1990
1978 and 
2005
1990 and 
2005
Root 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Root 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Root 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
25 For H(5) similar values are obtained
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1978 1990 2005
1978 and 
1990
1978 and 
2005
1990 and 
2005
Root 4 0,986 0,972 0,943 0,963 0,919 0,978
Root 5 0,872 0,663 0,715 0,647 0,643 0,621
Source: Author’s elaboration
Given the values of the above matrix and the graphs of the cointegrating re-
lationships, we can conclude, out of all the cases, there is only one cointegrating 
relationship26, which is summarized in the following table.
Table 8. Cointegration equation in break points27
LnG/C LnI/G LnY LnC/P LnN Break 1 Break 2 Cte
1978 1
–2,24 
(–4,65)
1,60 
(2,90)
1,10 
(1,46)
0,96 
(5,20)
0,06 
(1,89)
16,10 
(8,67)
1990 1
–5,38 
(–6,11)
2,35 
(3,12)
4,64 
(5,16)
1,85 
(5,79)
0,90 
(1,06)
32,78 
(7,33)
2005 1
–5,28 
(–7,07)
2,23 
(4,88) 
3,24 
(5,32) 
2,05 
(7,70) 
0,61 
(2,65) 
41,36 
(7,77)
1978 and 
2005
1
–2,70 
(–6,87)
0,37 
(1,54) 
1,47 
(4,68) 
0,94 
(6,31)
0,26 
(3,78)
0,18 
(1,41)
20,90 
(6,67)
1978 and 
1990
1
–2,34 
(–6,47)
0,29 
(0,91)
1,67 
(4,10)
0,81 
(5,69)
0,28 
(4,64)
0,08 
(1,12)
16,92 
(8,46)
1990 and 
200528
1
–4,10 
(–7,89)
2,38 
(5,33)
3,27 
(5,86)
1,97 
(9,44)
0,32 
(3,05)
0,51 
(3,41)
37,10 
(10,3)
Source: Author’s elaboration
Upon analyzing the above results, we can consider a priori the 1978 and 2005 
breakpoints to be significant. The first corresponds to the beginning of the demo-
cratic era in Spain, while the second marks the start of the current economic crisis. 
In view of these considerations, we conduct a reestimation of the cointegration 
vector taking 1978 and 2005 as breakpoints, along with 1978 and 1990 and, 1990 
and 2005. The equations obtained are displayed in the previous table. 
26 In all cases the coefficient LnG/C was normalized to 1
27 In parentheses, t statistics
28 In this model the equality to zero of the breakpoint coefficients does not reject the null in the case of 1990 
with χ (1) = 2,73 and a p-value of 0.098, but it does reject it for 2005 with χ=6,89 and a p-value of 0.009. 
Consequently, we consider that the model that best adjusts to reality is that which considers one lone 
breakpoint in 1978.
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We conducted various tests to analyze the suitability of the model. Firstly, dif-
ferent restrictions were applied to the subsets of the β vectors. We were initially 
interested in the validation of the structural breaks. To this end, we carried out X2 
tests of equality to zero on the coefficients of said breaks. In the case of structural 
breaks in 1978 and 2005, we found that in the case of the former, the value was 
χ2(1) = 6,20, with a p-value of 0,013, which clearly rejects the equality to zero of the 
corresponding coefficient. As for 2005, the value obtained was X2(1) = 1,41, with a 
p-value of 0,224, which leads us to accept the null hypothesis.
With regard to the structural breaks in 1978 and 1990, the same test provided 
values of χ2(1) = 0,52, with a p-value of 0,470, which means we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of equality to zero for the coefficient corresponding to 1990. In 
the case of the breakpoint in 1978, the value was χ2(1) = 9,71, with a p-value 0,002, 
which allows us to reject the null hypothesis of equality to zero for the coefficient 
corresponding to the breakpoint in 1978. 
In light of these results, the cointegration vector that should be applied is that 
corresponding to the 1978 breakpoint, which is displayed in the table above.
Regarding this cointegrating relationship, various hypothesis tests were carried 
out on its β coefficients. In the tests of equality to zero of the variable coefficients 
of the cointegrating relationship, we reject the null hypothesis in all cases29. This 
was not the case in equality to 1 of the LNY coefficient, where we obtained a value 
of χ2(2) = 4,01, with a p-value of 0,134. Similarly, we accept the null hypothesis in 
the case of equality to 1 of the population coefficient with a value of χ2(2) = 3,72, 
with a p-value of 0.155.
Finally, we have conducted weak exogeneity tests on the model variables, reject-
ing the null hypothesis of exogeneity in all cases. 
The results indicate that the deficit has a marked influence on spending growth 
with an elasticity of 2,24. The LnY coefficient reveals a validation of Wagner’s Law 
during this period30. The coefficient of the price differential would indicate a positive 
influence on public spending, as well as on the population coefficient, albeit the 
magnitude of the latter suggests economies of scale in public spending. 
Based on the previous cointegrating equation, the corresponding error correction 
model was formulated and is presented as follows: 
29 The values of chi-squared are 8,5, 7,31, 6,95 and 12,29 for the respective variables.
30 In Jaén and Molina (1997, 1999) it is seen how the data rejected said hypothesis, although works like that 
of Legrenzi and Milas (2002) attribute the no validation in Italy to a lack of other variables, similar to what 
occurred in this case. 
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Graph 6. Test of constancy of the parameters
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The error correction model reveals the lack of short-term influence on the indica-
tive variables of price differential and population.
In order to analyze the constancy of the parameters we utilized recursive estima-
tion methods. The corresponding calculations were carried out in two different ways. 
Using a basic sampling, we either re-estimated all the parameters in each period 
(X-form), or we merely re-estimated the long-term estimators of α and β, excluding 
31 In parentheses, t statistics
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the short-term dynamic utilizing the parameter estimators in the complete sampling 
(R1-form). 
The first contrast, which was for the constancy of β, revealed the maximum difference 
between the value of β in the base sampling and the value of β as the sampling size 
increases. The result indicated that all the values taken throughout the period were 
in the range below the critical value. The second recursively tests whether any fixed 
value of β, the estimator of β in the complete sampling, was contained within the 
expanded space by the estimator of β in the base sampling. Although in method X 
the behavior was not very suitable (considering that until 2001 the hypothesis was 
not validated), this was not the case in the second method, in which the hypothesis 
was validated from 1981. 
Graph 7. Test of constancy of the parameters
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The above graphs show the recursive estimation of the cointegrating equation 
coefficients using the period 1960-1985 as the base simple. Both graphs reveal that 
apart from small fluctuations, the estimators of the coefficients of all the model 
variables are constant. The breakpoint appears again in the form of a peak in the 
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various graphs, followed by a rather steady trajectory thereafter. 
We conducted another parallel study, albeit less detailed, utilizing the LnW vari-
able rather than LnN. Initially, we considered that there were no structural breaks 
in the data. In those conditions the Johansen-Juselius cointegration test provided 
the following results: 
Table 9. Cointegration test without considering breakpoints
Eigenvalues Trace Statistic Critical Value p-value
r = 0 0,52 195,38 85,55 0,001
r = 1 0,38 64,68 63,66 0,041
r = 2 0,30 38,39 42,77 0,132
Source: Author s´ elaboration
Graph 8. Residuals graph
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The hypothesis r = 0 is rejected, which means there is a cointegration vector 
when considering an unrestricted constant in the data. We have our doubts with 
regard to the second unit root as both the statistic and the p-value reveal a value 
close to 0.05. In this case we used the same test methods as in the previous case: 
residuals, companion matrix and cointegration vector. 
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In the case of the companion matrix and H(2) we obtained values of 1,1,1,0,939 
and 0,686, which provided us with four unit roots and one cointegration vector. The 
cointegration vector was [1, 4,9 (0,64), -17,29 (-2,01), 4,98 (0,74), 4,5 (0,76)] – a result 
which is hardly in accordance with the economic reality. Taking into consideration 
the results obtained for the residuals and cointegration equation, we conducted 
the same analysis for cointegrating relationships considering the different structural 
breakpoints. The results are displayed in the following table. 
Table 10. Cointegration test considering breakpoints
Eigenvalues Trace Statistic Critical Value p-value
1978
r = 0 0,62 134,17 113,12 0,010
r = 1 0,48 81,16 83,90 0,079
r = 2 0,32 44,86 58,60 0,432
1990
 r = 0 0,44 115,35 113,05 0,035
r = 1 0,42 83,48 83,92 0,054
r = 2 0,37 53,80 58,61 0,123
2005
r = 0 0,52 125,32 114,04 0,007
r = 1 0,48 85,34 82,12 0,028
r = 2 0,34 49,78 54,99 0,129
1978 and 1990
r = 0 0,63 148,72 102,51 0,000
r = 1 0,51 94,21 75,14 0,001
r = 2 0,38 55,28 51,77 0,023
r = 3 0,24 28,81 32,12 0,114
1978 and 2005
r = 0 0,62 141,43 102,80 0,000
r = 1 0,50 88,50 75,41 0.004
r = 2 0,35 50,44 52,03 0.069
1990 and 2005
r = 0 0,55 128,84 119,52 0.012
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Eigenvalues Trace Statistic Critical Value p-value
r = 1 0,45 84,92 85,39 0.054
r = 2 0,322 51,77 57,01 0.127
Source: Author’s elaboration
The results in this table indicate a cointegrating relationship when considering 
the breakpoints in 1978 and 1990 and two cointegrating relationships in 2005. 
When two breakpoints are considered, a cointegrating relationship is obtained 
for 1990 and 2005, two relationships for 1978 and 2005, and up to three relationships 
for 1978 and 1990. 
In order to not overextend the analysis any further we verified that all the 
cointegrating relationships determined that the hypothesis of equality to zero of 
the coefficients corresponding to the breakpoints in 1990 and 200532 could not 
be rejected. Finally, we obtained a cointegration equation corresponding to the 
breakpoint in 1978:
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1,04 4,08 0,67 1,64 5,25
1,34 6,14 0,44 7,61 1978 
G I
Ln LN LnY
C G
W
LnN Ln D
P
     =− − + − −        
 + +  
  [11]
where the equality to zero of the coefficients was rejected in all cases. In the 
tests of equality to 1, the null was accepted in the case of LnI/G with a value of χ2 (1) 
= 0,01, with a p-value of 0,925, as well as the equality to 1 of the coefficient LnC/P 
with χ2(1) = 0,002, with a p-value of 0,925. However, the equality to 1 was rejected 
for the coefficient LnY with χ2(1) = 9,33 and a p-value of 0.002.
The results reveal an elasticity of the deficit approximately equal to 1, which 
means the B-W hypothesis is confirmed. Moreover, income has an elasticity of 
less than 1, meaning that Wagner’s Law is accepted. Finally, the Baumol disparity 
hypothesis would then be confirmed since it predicts that the relative price coef-
ficient is negative.
Based on the previous cointegration equation, the corresponding error correc-
tion model was formulated.
32 The corresponding calculations are available to whomever requests them.
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 [12]
 In parallel to the first model, we also analyzed the constancy of the parameters 
in the cointegration vector. In this case we limited ourselves to conducting the 
recursive estimation of the cointegration equation coefficients33.
Graph 9. Test of constancy of the parameters
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Both graphs show that apart from small fluctuations the estimators of all the 
model variable coefficients are constant. Another breakpoint appears once again 
in the form of a peak in the various graphs, followed by a rather steady trajectory 
thereafter.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
33 The rest of the calculations are available to whomever requests them.
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This study sought to conduct an analysis of public spending growth in Spain based 
on a reduced model test of the B-W hypothesis. This model also allowed us to 
analyze the possible validation of one of the versions of Wagner’s Law, as well as 
the Baumol disparity hypothesis.
The present work makes two important contributions to the Spanish literature 
on this subject. Firstly, it encompasses a significantly longer sampling period than 
those considered in previous studies, which made it necessary to analyze the major 
changes that took place in Spain, from both economic and political perspectives. 
The most notable event was the end of Franco’s dictatorship, which gave way to the 
founding of a democratic government that had to address social demands which, in 
turn, implied increased public spending. The other two important events that were 
spurred by economic phenomena were joining the EU and the recent economic crisis. 
By utilizing techniques like unit roots and cointegration with structural breaks, we 
came to the conclusion that the only event that significantly affected the trajectory 
of public spending was the founding of the democratic government. Bearing this in 
mind, the two alternative equations formulated over the course of the study were 
estimated. 
The coefficients obtained in the first equation allowed us to confirm the validation 
of the B-W hypothesis, in broad terms. Firstly, precisely as expected, the public deficit 
coefficient was negative, which implies that a relative increase in tax revenues makes 
the demand for government spending decrease; or, in other terms, deficit increases 
government spending. This result is the same as that of Niskanen (1978) Raymond 
and Gonzalez-Paramo (1988) and Jaén (1999), and it agrees with Buchanan-Wagner’s 
proposition. The coefficient estimated for the income elasticity was positive with a 
value very close to the unit, which indicates, in line with Wagner’s Law, that a rise 
in income increases government spending. In the case of relative prices, the value 
obtained was positive, contradicting the Baumol production disparity hypothesis. 
Finally, the fact that the population coefficient value was less than 1 suggests 
economies of scale in public spending as population increases.
As regards the second equation, the results obtained were slightly different. 
The elasticity of public spending is approximately equal to 1, which confirms the 
B-W hypothesis. Moreover, the income had an elasticity less than 1, which means 
Wagner’s Law is not accepted. Finally, the Baumol disparity hypothesis is validated 
considering it predicts that the relative prices coefficient is negative.
If we compare the results obtained with the two equations, they are rather dif-
ferent. On one hand, both cases confirm the B-W hypothesis, but the results for the 
rest of the variables are quite different. This indicates instability when the variables 
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in the model are changed as merely one modification leads to rather varied results. 
However, on the other hand, we can observe stability in each model as the param-
eters obtained in both are constant throughout the various sampling sizes, exactly 
as shown in the recursive graphs.
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APPENDIX
Graphs of the six variables
LNGC
1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
LNIG
1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
LNY
1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
9.00
9.25
9.50
9.75
10.00
10.25
10.50
10.75
11.00
11.25
Public expenditure and deficit in Spain (1958-2014)
51Semestre Económico, volumen 19, No. 40, pp. 17-52 • ISSN 0120-6346, julio-septiembre de 2016, Medellín, Colombia
LNC/P
1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
-0.40
-0.35
-0.30
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
-0.00
0.05
LNN
1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
LNW
1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
6.25
6.50
6.75
7.00
7.25
7.50
7.75
Source: Author s´ elaboration

